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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Appellee, : 
vs. : Case No. 950408-CA 
ROLANDO CALEB BECKER : Priority No. 2 
Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
This is an appeal from convictions of theft, a second degree 
felony, evidence tampering, a second degree felony, possession of 
marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, and escape by a prisoner, a class 
B misdemeanor, rendered by Judge Anthony Schofield, in the Fourth 
District Court in and for Juab County, State of Utah. Utah Code 
Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) ( 1995 Supp. to Replacement Volume 9) 
provides this Court's jurisdiction over this case. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court conduct an inadequate voir dire? 
On appeal, this Court reviews a trial court's performance of 
jury voir dire with the abuse of discretion standard of review. 
1 
State v. Ontiveros. 835 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah App. 1992). "Whether 
a trial court abused its discretion in conducting voir dire depends 
on whether, 'considering the totality of the questioning, counsel 
was afforded an adequate opportunity to acquire the information 
necessary to evaluate [prospective] jurors.," Id. (citation 
omitted; brackets by the Court). 
The trial court' s failure to grant one challenge for cause was 
properly preserved by the challenge for cause (R. 116, 122, 128). 
The adequacy of the voir dire on juror relationships with witnesses 
and juror experiences with similar crimes was not properly 
preserved. Therefore, this Court must assess this aspect of the 
adequacy of the voir dire under the ineffective assistance of 
counsel and plain error doctrines. State v. Ellifritzf 835 P.2d 
170 (Utah App. 1992) . 
2. Did the triai court err in denying Mr. Becker's motion to 
suppress all evidence seized as a result of illegalities occurring 
during the traffic stop? 
This issue presents a mixed question of law and fact, the 
factual aspects of which the Court reviews with some deference, and 
the iegal conclusions of which the Court reviews for correctness. 
See State v. Mirquet, 844 P.2d 995 (Utah App.), affirmed, 268 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1995). 
This issue was properly preserved by the pretrial motion to 
suppress (R. 173 ). 
3. Did the trial court err in refusing Mr. Becker's lesser 
included offense instruction? 
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This issue presents a question of law, to be reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Simpson. 274 Utah Adv. Rep. 44, 45 (Utah 
App. 1995). 
This issue was properly preserved by trial counsel' s request 
for the instruction and objection to the trial court' s failure to 
give it (R. 120, 212; T. 339, 341). 
4. Did the trial court err in admitting evidence concerning 
Trooper Mangelson' s assumptions the contents of the paper bag taken 
from the scene of the traffic stop by Mr. Becker? 
The standard of review for this type of issue is somewhat 
deferential. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994). 
This issue was properly preserved by the motion in limine 
filed by Mr. Means (R. 127-128). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following constitutional and statutory provisions are 
included in Appendix 1 to this brief: 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 7 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 10 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 14 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
United States Constitution, Amendment V 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI 
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-la-1311 
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-la-1314 
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-1-402 
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-401 
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-404 
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-1-6 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 
Utah Rule of Evidence 401 
Utah Rule of Evidence 402 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 
Utah Rule of Evidence 702. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Becker was charged by information dated and filed October 
8, 1993, with one count of theft of a vehicle, a second degree 
felony, one count of evidence tampering, a second degree felony, 
possession of marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, and escape by a 
prisoner, a class B misdemeanor (R. 1). 
The Honorable Anthony Schofield appointed Milton T. Harmon to 
represent Mr. Becker at the time of Mr. Becker' s arraignment on 
October 19, 1993 (R. 2). 
At the preliminary hearing, on November 3, 1993, Magistrate 
Schofield ordered Mr. Becker bound over as charged, accepted Mr. 
Becker' s pleas of not guilty on behalf of the district court, and 
ordered counsel to obtain and trial date and inform Mr. Becker (R. 
6, 8; P.H. 39). 
At the pretrial conference on June 3, 1994, District Court 
Judge Park appointed Thomas Means to represent Mr. Becker, after 
extensive conflicts arose between Mr. Becker and previous counsel 
(R. 117). 
The jury convicted Mr. Becker as he was charged (R. 219-222). 
The minute entry for November 22, 1994, indicates Mr. Means' 
motion to withdraw as counsel for Mr. Becker because of Mr. 
Becker's lack of confidence in him (R. 228). The court denied the 
motion, but indicated an intention to reconsider the motion after 
sentencing (R. 228). 
Mr. Means filed a motion to reduce the degree of offenses (R. 
229-231). 
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On June 2, 1995, Judge Anthony Schofield sentenced Mr. Becker 
to maximum sentences and fines on the second degree felonies, and 
to maximum sentences on the misdemeanors, with all sentences to run 
concurrently (R. 302). The judge suspended the sentences and 
placed Mr. Becker on probation, a condition of which was his 
service of 90 days in jail (R. 302). 
On June 8, 1995, Mr. Means filed his withdrawal of counsel and 
the notice of appeal on Mr. Becker's behalf (R. 297-300). Douglas 
Neeley .entered his appearance of counsel on July 6, 1995 (R. 309). 
On September 1, 1995, Thomas Means filed a motion for a 
certificate of probable cause and supporting memorandum (R. 316-
321). Mr. Neeley filed a request for a ruling (R. 322-323). The 
trial court denied the motion for a certificate of probable cause 
(R. 325). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
STATE' S CASE IN CHIEF 
On October 7, 1993, near Nephi in Juab County, Trooper 
Mangelson stopped a car for speeding at the rate of 76 miles per 
hour in a 65 mile an hour zone at about 11:45 a.m. (T. 154, 168). 
Mangelson' s car was normally equipped with a video camera, but it 
was unavailable during the events of this case (T. 174-175). 
Mr. Becker was a passenger in the front seat; Michael Wilson 
was a passenger in the back seat; and Lisa La Barrie was the driver 
(T. 154-155, 161). The car had California plates (T. 155). 
Upon stopping the car, Mangelson informed Ms. La Barrie about 
the speeding and requested her identification and registration (T. 
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156). She produced a New Mexico driver' s license from the trunk of 
the car, and a rental agreement for the car (T. 156). Ms. La 
Barrie was properly licensed and the car was properly registered 
(T. 183). Mangelson was suspicious because the car had been rented 
by someone named Wilson, and Ms. La Barrie explained that Mr. 
Becker' s girlfriend had rented the car because she had a credit 
card (T. 157). Mr. Becker was listed on the rental agreement as an 
additional driver (T. 157). Mangelson asked Wilson for his 
identification to investigate whether Mr. Wilson was related to the 
woman who had rented the car, as indicated by Lisa La Barrie (T. 
181-182). Mangelson obtained Mr. Becker's license to confirm that 
the information listed on the rental agreement was correct, and it 
was (T. 158). Mangelson kept Mr. Becker' s driver' s license in 
his pocket (T. 169). 
Mangelson asked where they were going and they told him they 
were headed to Albuquerque from Los Angeles (T. 157). This made 
Mangelson suspicious because the route they were on was not the 
most direct route (T. 157). 
He testified that he noticed a distinct odor of burnt 
marijuana immediately upon approaching the open window of the car, 
and that shortly after he examined the rental agreement, he 
confronted the occupants of the car about the marijuana (T. 158). 
He said the marijuana smelled as if it had been used recently, 
although he could not tell which occupant of the car had been using 
it (T. 177). He asked them if they were using marijuana (T. 159). 
Mangelson testified, "They denied any use of it at first. They 
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seemed a little bit reluctant. I then told them that I could smell 
it. It was obvious. It was as plain as day that someone in the 
car was using it. At that point and time, Mr. Becker did 
acknowledge that they had smoked a joint and made a gesture towards 
the ashtray. There was a roach in the ashtray." (T. 159). 
Mangelson seized two roaches from the ashtray (T. 159-160). He 
asked if there were more drugs in the car, and Mr. Becker told him 
they had only the one joint that they had smoked (T. 160). 
Mangelson requested permission to search the car, which Mr. Becker 
granted, saying, "Go ahead." (T. 160). Mangelson had them 
exit the car, and then he searched the passenger compartment, where 
he found a bag of marijuana stuffed in the crack in the back 
passenger seat near where Mr. Wilson had been sitting (T. 161). 
He asked Lisa La Barrie to open the trunk for him and she did (T. 
162). He strongly suspected there were more drugs in the car, and 
when he tore down some carpeting in the trunk, he found a paper bag 
which contained a plastic bag containing either methamphetamine or 
crack cocaine (T. 162-163). 
He asked Lisa, "What is this, and whose is it?" (T. 163). 
She responded that she had no idea, had nothing to do with it, and 
did not know anything about it (T. 164). Mr. Becker then went and 
got in the driver' s seat of the car and reached to start the car, 
but the keys were still in the trunk (T. 164). Mangelson put the 
paper bag on top of the car, and when Mr. Becker got out of the 
car, Mangelson grabbed him and told him he was under arrest (T. 
164). Mr. Becker broke free, grabbed the paper sack off the roof 
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of the car, and ran (T. 165). Mangelson drew his gun and ordered 
Mr. Becker to stop, but Mr. Becker told Mangelson that Mangelson 
could not shoot Becker because Becker was unarmed (T. 165). Mr. 
Becker ran to a nearby gas station and got into a car and drove 
away, despite the car owner' s efforts to intervene by jumping on 
the hood of the car (T. 165-166). 
The police chased Mr. Becker, and searched for him with a 
helicopter and some dogs (T. 169). They never recovered the paper 
bag or its contents (T. 168). 
The police found the stolen car abandoned the same day, and 
Mr. Becker was arrested without incident the next day at a local 
convenience store (T. 167-173). 
When Mr. Becker was booked in the jail, Mangelson asked him 
where he was born, his social security number, and about the sack, 
which Mr. Becker denied knowledge of and said did not exist (T. 
171-172). 
In completing an inventory search of the car, Mangelson found 
a cigarette package containing marijuana, and some rolling papers 
in a duffle bag in the trunk of the car (T. 172-173). Lisa La 
Barrie claimed the duffle bag as hers (T. 178). 
He testified that on marijuana charges, the bail set is the 
amount of the fine, and that Ms. La Barrie and Mr. Wilson either 
both pled guilty to possession of the marijuana or forfeited the 
bail (T. 180). 
Nephi City police officer Bruce Bills confirmed testimony 
about the car having been stolen and later recovered, and testified 
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that there was no fingerprint evidence tying Mr. Becker to the 
stolen car (T. 209-213). 
Bill Thompkins, Juab County Deputy Sheriff, testified that the 
day after the traffic stop, someone from the Circle C called in and 
reported a bedraggled looking black man in the store, and Thompkins 
went in in plain clothes and arrested Mr. Becker (T. 216-220). 
Thompkins testified that after he informed Mr. Becker of his 
Miranda rights, Mr. Becker told him there were not any drugs, and 
if there had been, the police would not have been smart enough to 
find them (T. 220). The court explained that the prosecutor had 
failed to inform defense counsel of this statement prior to trial, 
and that it was therefore stricken (T. 221). 
Joseph Walker testified that he met Mr. Becker when Mr. Becker 
was in jail on this case, and Mr. Walker was in the jail for 
possession of twenty pounds of marijuana and some methamphetamine 
in a drug-free zone (T. 236, 241, 247). Walker admitted to having 
several felony convictions, possibly four or five, to having been 
to prison four times, and to having been convicted of fraud 
involving food stamps (T. 237, 247). Walker denied having been 
promised anything in exchange for his testimony (T. 240), but 
admitted to working as an informant in the past (T. 243). He was 
facing a different drug charge at the time of his testimony in this 
case (T. 258). He said that Mr. Becker wanted to get a message to 
Mr. Becker* s girlfriend, Lisa La Barrie, that he had not been 
found with any drugs (T. 239). There were witnesses to their 
conversation, but he could not recall who they were (T. 260). 
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Bill Thompkins testified that Mr. Walker had been a reliable 
informant (T. 265). 
DEFENSE CASE 
Lisa La Barrie testified that on October 7, 1993, she was 
driving the car stopped by Trooper Mangelson, and Mr. Becker and 
Michael Wilson were asleep at the time of the stop (T. 274-275). 
Prior to the drive, she had flown to California to visit Michael 
Wilson, and then they had Mr. Becker' s girlfriend rent a car for 
them to drive back to New Mexico, where La Barrie lived, and where 
Mr. Wilson wanted to return to visit Ms. La Barrie' s cousin (T. 
293). Mr. Becker was going along for the ride (T. 294). She had 
known Mr. Becker for only a week prior to this incident, and had 
very limited contact with him prior to trial (T. 291). At the time 
of trial, Mr. Becker drove Ms. La Barrie from the Salt Lake Airport 
to court in Nephi, but they did not discuss her upcoming testimony 
(T. 315). 
On October 7, 1993, she said she was speeding at the rate of 
70 miles an hour in a 65 mile an hour zone, and Mangelson stopped 
her and asked for her license and registration (T. 276-277). At 
Mangelson' s request, she retrieved her license from the trunk and 
had Mr. Becker get the registration information, because the car 
was a rental and she did not know where the paperwork was (T. 277). 
She testified that she gave Mangelson the keys to the car at his 
request after she had retrieved her identification from the trunk, 
and that she left the trunk half open (T. 304). 
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Mangelson twice told her that he could smell marijuana in the 
car, and she twice told him that he could not (T. 278). She 
testified that none of them smoked any marijuana in the car, but 
that she had smoked a joint some twenty minutes prior to the stop 
outside the car (T. 279, 297). She told him there was no other 
marijuana in the car, although she had some marijuana in the car 
under the driver's seat (T. 279-298). Neither Michael Wilson nor 
Mr. Becker possessed any marijuana, but Lisa and Michael had smoked 
some outside of the car near a gas station (T. 280). She said that 
there were no roaches in the ashtray (T. 281). She told Mangelson 
that they had not smoked any in the car (T. 282). Mr. Becker made 
no admissions about the marijuana (T. 318). 
They were following traveling instructions from Triple A and 
Michael had made a wrong turn when he was driving, so they were off 
course (T. 294). She said that Mangelson asked where they were 
going, and after she told him they were headed to New Mexico, he 
asked if they were gang members and said that they looked like they 
were when she denied it (T. 282-283). He told her she was a damned 
liar and began waving his gun around and ordered them out of the 
car (T. 283). On cross-examination, she testified that Mangelson 
searched the car while Mr. Becker and Mr. Wilson were still in it, 
and it was only after he discussed and found the marijuana that he 
began waving his gun around (T. 299-303). His gun was out for 
about five minutes while he was determining whether or not they 
were gang members (T. 307). 
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Mangelson asked if he could search the car and she told him, 
"Sure." (T. 283). It was then that Mangelson found her bag of 
marijuana under her car seat (T. 284). Mangelson found no paper 
sack, and did not ask her about any paper sack (T. 284). She was 
aware of no paper sack in the car (T. 285). She testified that he 
searched the trunk and found nothing (T. 304). He never told her 
she was under arrest (T. 306). 
It was after Mangelson then began approaching Mr. Wilson and 
Mr. Becker that Mr. Becker ran (T. 285). She testified that Mr. 
Becker ran away because Mangelson was pointing his gun at them (T. 
309). After searching the trunk, Mangelson had drawn his gun 
again, and was directing Ms. La Barrie to go sit next to Mr. 
Becker and directing Mr. Wilson to walk toward the officer, and 
that was when Mr. Becker took off (T. 309). She saw Mr. Becker 
run into an open field, and never saw him steal a car (T. 311). 
Mangelson never arrested Mr. Becker or grabbed him, and Mr. Becker 
never got in the driver's seat (T. 286). She could not recall Mr. 
Becker saying anything when Mangelson drew his gun and ordered him 
to stop (T. 287). 
Mr. Wilson and she waited at the site of the stop for three to 
five minutes, before another officer arrived (T. 288-289). The 
officer who arrived did not cuff them, but directed them to drive 
behind him to Nephi, to be processed at the jail, so they did (T. 
289-290). 
Lisa La Barrie pled guilty to the possession of marijuana 
charge, because she was the one who possessed the marijuana (T. 
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290). She claimed the cigarette package that was in evidence as 
hers, but said that Mangelson never found it and never searched her 
purse while she was there; she did not see the cigarette package 
until she got to the jail (T. 307). She said that there was no 
marijuana in her cigarette package, but said that any marijuana 
found in the car was hers, and that the rolling papers were hers 
(T. 317-318). Mangelson may have searched her purse again while 
she was in jail (T. 320). 
She denied ever having received a message from Joseph Walker 
from Mr. Becker that the police had found no drugs on Mr. Becker 
(T. 291). 
STATE1 S REBUTTAL CASE 
In rebuttal, Mangelson denied having drawn his gun before Mr. 
Becker took off (T. 323). He confirmed Ms. La Barrie's testimony 
about having left the scene before another officer arrived to take 
custody of Ms. La Barrie and Mr. Wilson, but said that Mr. Wilson 
was cuffed before Mangelson left (T. 323-325). 
Charlie Wilson testified in rebuttal that he could not recall 
exactly, but it seemed like he retrieved Mr. Wilson, who was 
cuffed, and had Ms. La Barrie drive the car into town to the 
sheriff's office (T. 329). Mangelson told him, partially over the 
radio, about Mr. Becker's having taken off with the sack (T. 3 34). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The voir dire in this case was inadequate because many of the 
prospective jurors were involved in personal relationships with the 
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prosecutor and witnesses for the State. The trial court did not 
conduct an adequate voir dire to rebut the inference of bias 
attaching to these prospective jurors, and two of the jurors served 
in Mr. Becker* s case. Another juror who served was not questioned 
adequately to rebut an inference of bias attaching to him as a 
result of his step-daughter' s conviction for a drug offense. Mr. 
Becker is entitled to a new, fair trial. 
The trial court erred in denying Mr. Becker' s motion to 
suppress the evidence. Prior to locating any incriminating 
evidence, Trooper Mangelson conducted a custodial interrogation 
without the benefit of Miranda warnings. Mr. Becker should have a 
new trial where all evidence derived from the interrogation is 
suppressed. 
The trial court should have given the jurors Mr. Becker' s 
requested lesser included offense instruction. The charged and 
lesser offense include overlapping elements, and the evidence 
provided a rational basis for acquitting Mr. Becker of the auto 
theft charge and convicting him of class A misdemeanor joyriding. 
The trial court should have excluded evidence regarding 
Trooper Mangelson' s speculations about what was in the paper bag 
that Mr. Becker took with him when he left the scene of the traffic 
stop. The contents of the bag were not relevant to any issue, and 
the admission of the speculation and the prosecutor' s argument 
about it may well have unfairly prejudiced the jury. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE INADEQUATE VOIR DIRE 
REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
A. Facts of this case 
During the voir dire, several of the jurors indicated their 
acquaintances with the prosecutor and witnesses for the state. Ms. 
Wilson was the Nephi City Treasurer, and had worked with the 
prosecutor and the police officers, but said she did not socialize 
with them and would be not be prejudiced as a result of that 
acquaintance (T. 69-70). Mr. Hall, the County Health Inspector, 
had worked with the prosecutor and been represented by him 
personally in the past, and knew the police officers, but said he 
socialized with them "very little" (T. 71). He indicated that he 
would not be prejudiced against either party as a result of his 
dealings with the prosecutor, but was not asked about how his 
relationship with the officers would influence his performance (T. 
71). Ms. Whittington knew all the police and the attorneys as 
casual acquaintances and in her employment for a bank, but said 
that she did not socialize with them and said she would be unbiased 
(T. 73-74). Mr. Connor was familiar with the prosecutor because 
the prosecutor had done some legal work for Mr. Connor three months 
prior to the trial, but Mr. Connor said that the transaction was 
complete and he would not be prejudiced against either party (T. 
71-72). Mr. Wankier knew the police and spoke with them when he 
saw them, but did not socialize with them, and said he would be 
unbiased (T. 75). Mr. Newell knew the prosecutor, Trooper 
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Mangelson, and other police officers, and said that he "had a 
pretty good regard for them" when he was their high school 
principal, but said he would be unbiased (T. 75-76). Mr. Reed had 
been represented by the prosecutor before and was working with him 
in the scouting program at the time of trial, was familiar with the 
police. While he said he would not be influenced by his dealings 
with the prosecutor, he was not asked about any influence that his 
relationships with the police might have on his performance (T. 76-
78). Ms. Jensen worked with the prosecutor and knew the police 
officers, and said she would be unbiased by her relationship with 
the prosecutor, but was not asked about how her relationship with 
the police might influence her (T. 78-79). 
The trial court gave the defense the opportunity to ask 
supplemental voir dire questions, but Mr. Means did not inquire 
further about the jurors' relationships with the officers (T. 107-
111). 
When the time came to make challenges for cause, Mr. Means 
indicated on the record outside the presence of the prospective 
jurors, "Also it goes without saying that the fact that a number of 
these jurors know one or more of these officers is not going to be 
grounds for cause because of the practicality of it. It is a small 
town and they are going to run into these people from time to 
time." When the court indicated, "Well, the fact that they know 
them, I don't think is grounds for cause any where," Mr. Means 
stated that he understood. (T. 129). Mr. Means asked the 
prosecutor if he knew if the jurors' relationships with the police 
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went beyond mere casual recognition, and the trial court indicated 
that the prosecutor could answer if he knew, but that the jurors 
were the best sources of that information (T. 130). The prosecutor 
indicated that the police officers were from Levan, the court noted 
that some of the prospective jurors were from Levan, and no 
additional voir dire was requested or conducted on this topic (T. 
130). 
In response to the court1 s question about whether any of the 
panelists had been victims of crimes, or had victims of crimes in 
their families, Clyde Elmer stated, "I have a step daughter that 
was a victim of drugs. ... She was put on trial and sentenced." (T. 
94). After establishing that she had been tried locally, the court 
followed up with this inquiry: 
Is there any bias or prejudice created for or 
against either party as a result of that experience? 
No. 
Could you fairly and impartially try this case based 
on the testimony and evidence that you would hear in the 
courtroom? 
Yes, I believe I could. 
(T. 95). Mr. Means did not request further voir dire of Mr. Elmer 
on this issue. 
Mr. Means challenged several jurors for cause on the basis of 
their relationships with the prosecutor (T. 113-128). The trial 
court denied the challenge for cause of juror Connor, which was 
based on his having hired the prosecutor to do legal work on his 
grandmother' s estate three months prior to this trial (T. 116, 122, 
128). Mr. Means did not challenge for cause Mr. Elmer or Mr. 
Newell. 
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After the challenges for cause, Mr. Means passed the jury for 
cause (T. 131). 
Mr. Newell, Mr. Connor and Mr. Elmer served on the jury (T. 
131) . 
B. Applicable law 
The state and federal constitutions require trial courts 
insure fair trials by conducting sufficient voir dire proceedings. 
E.g. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 and nn. 1-6 (Utah 
1988) (citing Article I, sections 7, 10 and 12 of the Utah 
constitution, and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution), reversed on other grounds, State v. Menzies, 
889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994). The Utah Supreme Court has exercised its 
supervisory power to reiterate to the trial courts of this state 
that it is their responsibility to insure that voir dire 
proceedings not only provide adequate information for the informed 
exercise of peremptory challenges, but also eliminate bias and 
prejudice from criminal trials. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 797-
798 (Utah 1991). In James, the court directed the trial courts to 
go beyond the minimally adequate voir dire required by federal 
constitutional standards, to thoroughly detect and probe juror 
biases to the best of their ability. Id. Utah's allegiance to the 
need for thorough voir dire in criminal cases has been strong and 
consistent. E.g. State v. Worthenf 765 P. 2d 839, 844-45 (Utah 
1988); State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055, 1058-1061 (Utah 1984). 
n[T]he fairness of a trial may depend on the right of counsel 
to ask voir dire questions designed to discover attitudes and 
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biases, both conscious and subconscious, even though they 'would 
not have supported a challenge for cause.' All that is necessary 
for a voir dire question to be appropriate is that it allow 
'defense counsel to exercise peremptory challenges more 
intelligently.'11 State v. Worthen. 765 P. 2d 839, 845 (Utah 
1988)(citation omitted). 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-1-6(1)(f) codifies the right to an 
impartial jury, and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(e)(14) 
requires trial courts to conduct voir dire proceedings that are 
adequate to reveal juror bias. The rule provides that a juror 
should be removed for cause if the voir dire indicates "that a 
state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to the 
cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting 
impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the 
party challenging[.]" 
Utah law recognizes that when jurors have relationships with 
witnesses or attorneys in the case, they cannot serve impartially. 
State v. Brooks. 563 P.2d 799, 800-803 (Utah 1977); Utah Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 18(e)(4) (authorizing a challenge for cause for 
"the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other 
relationship between the prospective juror and any party, witness 
or person alleged to have been victimized or injured by the 
defendant, which relationship when viewed objectively, would 
suggest to reasonable minds that the prospective juror would be 
unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be free of 
favoritism."); Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(e)(14) 
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(authorizing a challenge for cause if "a state of mind exists on 
the part of the juror with reference to the cause, or to either 
party, which will prevent him from acting impartially and without 
prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging[.]"). 
Even if such jurors claim the ability to serve impartially, a court 
commits reversible error in failing to grant a challenge for cause 
of such jurors in the absence of an adequate voir dire. Id. See 
also State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656, 658-661 (Utah App. 1992) (inference 
of bias attaches to jurors involved with attorney and witnesses, 
which the trial court must rebut with meaningful voir dire, or 
excuse the jurors for cause). 
Utah law has long recognized that trial courts may not simply 
accept a juror's assessment of his or her ability to try a case 
fairly; where preliminary voir dire raises a question about the 
juror's ability to serve, it is incumbent upon the trial court to 
ask probing questions to determine if the juror bears latent biases 
which would impair the juror's performance. See State v. Woolley, 
810 P.2d 440, 441 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 
1991)(when prospective juror has been a victim of a crime similar 
to that at issue in the case, an inference of bias arises, which is 
not rebutted by a juror's claim that he can be fair and impartial). 
See also State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473, 475 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 25-27 (Utah 1984); State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 
878, 884 (Utah 1981); Jenkins v Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah 
1981); State v. Cox, supra. As the Court stated in Evans v. Doty, 
824 P.2d 460 (Utah App, 1991), lf[I]t is not enough for a trial 
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judge to ask questions merely to discover a potential juror's overt 
biases. The judge must also allow counsel the opportunity to hear 
responses to questions that may indicate hidden or subconscious 
attitudes. Without such an opportunity, the prospect of impaneling 
a fair and impartial jury is diminished." Id. at 462. 
In the instant case, the trial court should have granted Mr. 
Means' challenge for cause of juror Connor, who had hired the 
prosecutor to do some legal work for him three months prior to this 
trial. The voir dire was inadequate to rebut the inference of bias 
arising from their relationship. E.g. Cox, supra. Trial counsel 
should have challenged for cause or requested further voir dire of 
juror Newell, who held the prosecutor and police officers who 
testified against Mr. Becker in high regard as a result of their 
relationship with him. Id. Trial counsel should have challenged 
for cause or requested additional voir dire of juror Elmer, whose 
step-daughter had been convicted of a drug offense, and who 
characterized his step-daughter as a "victim1' . Woolley. The trial 
court had the responsibility to conduct an adequate voir dire of 
these jurors, and in the absence of record proof rebutting the 
inference of bias attaching to these jurors, the trial court should 
have removed them for cause. E.g. Cox; Woolley. The trial court' s 
perfunctory questions to the jurors concerning the jurors' ability 
to try the case without prejudice to either party were inadequate 
to rebut the inference of prejudice attaching to the jurors. Id. 
The trial court' s failure to grant the challenge for cause of 
juror Connor is an adequate basis for reversing Mr. Becker' s 
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conviction. Cox. Should this Court wish to address the remaining 
voir dire errors, the Court may do so on the basis of the plain 
error or ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines. See e.g. 
State v. Ellifritzr 835 P.2d 170 (Utah App. 1992)(discussing both 
doctrines in the context of jury voir dire). The record does not 
indicate that Mr. Means made a tactical decision to seat jurors 
Elmer and Newell, and there could be no valid reason for seating 
these jurors in the absence of an adequate investigation of the 
inference of bias attaching to them. Mr. Means' indication that 
a prospective juror1 s knowing a witness would not support a 
challenge for cause because the trial was being held in a small 
town where people were prone to know one another (T. 129-130), and 
Mr. Means' willingness to rely on the prosecutor to provide 
information about the jurors' relationships with the police even 
after the trial court stated that the jurors were the proper source 
of that information (T. 130), demonstrate that Mr. Means was 
unfamiliar with the law governing the issue, and was not acting 
within the bounds of reasonable performance. The errors involved 
should have been plain to the trial court. Because of the service 
of three jurors who were presumptively prejudiced, a new trial is 
in order. E.g. Cox. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT 
SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
A. Facts of this case 
Relying on the federal and state constitutions, Mr. Means 
moved to suppress all evidence stemming from the warrantless search 
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of the car (R. 170-171). At the hearing on the motion, Officer 
Mangelson was the only witness who testified. 
He indicated that on October 7, 1993, at about 11:30 a.m., he 
came into contact with Mr. Becker during a traffic stop, which 
involved speeding at the radar-detected rate of 76 miles an hour in 
a 65 mile an hour zone (T. 17-18). As the vehicle came to a stop, 
Mr. Becker and Mr. Wilson, the two passengers, who had been 
sleeping, sat up (T. 18). Mangelson told the driver, Lisa La 
Barrie, why he had stopped the car and asked for her license and 
registration (T. 19). She told him that her license was in her 
purse in the trunk, and she got out and retrieved it (T. 19). 
Rather than producing the registration, she produced a rental 
agreement for the car, and he noted that the listed renter was not 
in the car (T. 19). When he asked Ms. La Barrie about this, she 
told him that the renter had rented the car because she had a 
credit card, and that Mr. Becker was listed as an authorized 
driver, which he was (T. 20). Mr. Becker was in the front 
passenger seat (T. 20). Mangelson asked Mr. Becker for his 
identification, which he produced (T. 48). Mr. Becker's license 
was in order, but Mangelson held it (T. 47-48). Mangelson could 
not recall when he got identification from the other passenger (T. 
48). The driver was properly licensed and the car's registration 
was proper (T. 43). Mangelson considered them to be in violation 
of the rental agreement because Lisa La Barrie was not listed as a 
driver (T. 44). He did not feel that the rental agreement was any 
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reason to stop the car, and their possession of the car was proper 
(T. 44). 
At some point, Mangelson asked them where they were headed, 
and Lisa La Barrie told him they were headed to Albuquerque, on the 
route recommended by an auto club. Mangelson was suspicious 
because they were not on the correct route (T. 45). 
At some point in time, Mangelson detected the smell of burnt 
marijuana coming from the car, and he asked all three of the car 
occupants about it (T. 20). He testified that he smelled the 
marijuana immediately upon approaching the car, when the driver 
opened her window (T. 43). He indicated that all three of them 
were quite hesitant, but that Mr. Becker told him that they had 
smoked one joint, but that that was all the marijuana that they had 
(T. 20). Mangelson testified that Mr. Becker "referred to the ash 
tray," where there was a joint, which Mangelson retrieved at that 
point (T. 21). Later, Mangelson testified, "I asked them if they 
were using it. They said that they were not. I said that I can 
smell it as plain as day. I know that you are using it. Then Mr. 
Becker said that yes we did. We smoked a joint. He referred to 
the ash tray." (T. 46). There were no Miranda warnings given (T. 
47). 
Mangelson then asked if there was more marijuana in the car, 
and they told him there was not (T. 21). He asked if he could look 
through the car, and Mr. Becker told him, "Go ahead." (T. 22). 
Mangelson had everyone exit the car and he searched them for 
weapons and told them to stand in an area where he could see them 
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(T. 22). He first searched the car interior, where he found a bag 
of marijuana stuffed in the seat where Mr. Wilson had been sitting 
(T. 22). Then he had the driver open the trunk of the car. He 
testified, "I then asked the driver to open the trunk for me and 
she got the keys. As she retrieved the keys from the ignition she 
looked at Mr. Becker and you could tell she had a real sick look on 
her face, that she really didnp t want to open the trunk but she did 
comply." (T. 23). Mangelson searched through the trunk and 
underneath the carpeting, he found a paper sack containing a 
plastic bag containing a half a pound to a pound of an off-white 
rocky substance that he knew was cocaine or methamphetamine (T. 24, 
26). Mangelson also found a gun in Lisa La Barrie' s bag (T. 36). 
There was no evidence presented concerning the impound and 
inventory policy governing Trooper Mangelson' s search. 
Prior to the argument of counsel on the motion to suppress, 
the trial court indicated that the traffic stop was valid, and that 
Trooper Mangelson's seizure of the roaches gave him "absolutely 
complete articulable suspicion in this case to continue the 
search," which was also bolstered by Mr. Becker' s permission to 
search (T. 54-55). 
Mr. Means responded that the purported consent by Mr. Becker 
was only for the passenger compartment and did not extend to the 
trunk of the car (T. 55). He argued under State v. Mirquetf 844 
P.2d 995 (Utah App.), affirmed, 268 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1995), 
that because Mangelson failed to give Mr. Becker his Miranda 
warnings prior to accusing him of smoking the marijuana, all 
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evidence seized thereafter should be suppressed (T. 55-56). The 
prosecutor responded, 
To respond to this, this case is different than 
[Mirquet]. In [Mirquet]f the officer, Sergeant Mangelson 
stated that I can smell Marijuana, go get the marijuana. 
Mr. [Mirquet] went and got the Marijuana. That is not 
the case in this case. 
Mr. Becker merely said that we have been smoking 
Marijuana and made some reference to the ashtray. The 
officer retrieved the evidence. He then asked for 
consent and that was not the case in [Mirquet]. There 
was no consent given. 
The officer in this case went and got consent and 
then went and found additional Marijuana within the 
passenger compartment. Clearly, that consent was never 
withdrawn. He clearly still had sufficient probable 
cause even without consent to make a search of the trunk. 
If he found marijuana in one particular part of the 
vehicle he has clear additional probable cause to make 
additional searches. He is going to make a custodial 
arrest of these individuals anyway. There is going to be 
an inventory search to boot. 
Further with respect to the [Mirquet] Case, it is 
still our position that the Court of Appeals is wrong and 
the Supreme Court has granted Cert on that case and is 
presently before them, the Supreme Court, for the final 
decision as to that issue. 
(T. 57-58). Defense counsel responded, 
If you had found, your Honor, that Mr. Becker had given 
consent and the Miranda Warnings are not necessary and he 
freely gave consent then you also need to find whether or 
not that consent was attenuated from his previous seizure 
and the questioning of him by the officer. Again, if the 
officer had seized the Marijuana illegally, because in my 
opinion the reference that Mr. Becker made to the 
marijuana should not have been admitted into evidence. 
Then beyond that point any search just because 
Marijuana is found in one part of the car legally, 
doesn' t allow a search of the rest of the car. It might 
provide for probable cause but it doesn' t provide the 
authority to search further. It provides a basis for a 
search warrant. The consent of Mr. Becker should be 
attenuated from the previous seizure of that Marijuana 
Cigarette in the ashtray if it was not seized properly. 
The point of the testimony that no time passed for Mr. 
Becker to seek counsel to consider his responses and all 
of the factors that are necessary in an attenuation. 
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(T. 58-59). The prosecutor disagreed, stating, 
Your Honor, the attenuation would only come into 
play if there had been a legal search. There wasn' t any 
legal search. The officer, based upon the odor of 
Marijuana, had probable cause without consent to make a 
search anyway. Since this was a highway stop and was not 
probable cause to obtain a search warrant, is probable 
cause to make a warrantless search. This is a highway 
stop and the automotive exception of the warrant 
requirement comes into play. 
(T. 59). The trial court ruled, 
I agree. I will making the finding that in this 
particular case, Mr. Means, where the officer smelled the 
Marijuana. The defendant admitted to having smoked the 
Marijuana. The officer asked for a search of the 
vehicle. He searched the compartment and found Marijuana 
in the backseat as I recall stuffed under the backseat 
the bag of Marijuana, and this is sufficient evidence to 
continue the search into the trunk of the vehicle where 
he discovered the other evidence. 
Your motion to suppress is denied on all counts. 
(T. 59-60). 
B. Applicable law 
As Mr. Means argued, State v. Mirquet, 844 P. 2d 995 (Utah 
App.), affirmed, 268 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1995), controls this 
case. Mr. Mirquet was stopped by Trooper Mangelson for speeding, 
and while Mirquet was in Mangelson' s patrol car to see the radar 
reading, Mangelson smelled burnt marijuana and stated, "It's 
obvious to me you' ve been smoking marijuana. Do you care to go get 
the marijuana for me, or do you want me to find it?" Mr. Mirquet 
went and retrieved two joints from his car. 844 P.2d at 996. 
Mangelson then went and searched the passenger compartment of the 
car, finding more drugs and paraphernalia, and searched the trunk 
of the car, where he found more drugs. Id. On appeal, this Court 
and the Utah Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that Trooper 
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Mangelson owed Mr. Mirquet a Miranda warning prior to inquiring 
about the marijuana, and that all evidence seized after the 
interrogation was properly suppressed. 844 P.2d at 997-1001; 268 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4. 
Similarly, in the instant case, the occupants of the car 
should have been given Miranda warnings prior to Mangelson' s having 
told them it was "plain as day" that they were smoking marijuana, 
and pressured them to confess. At the time of these comments, 
Mangelson had stopped their car by the side of the interstate and 
seized their identification. See State v. Shoulderblade, 276 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 26, 28 (Utah 1995)(" Shoulderblade was not free to leave. 
His license had not been returned."). His investigation was 
focused solely on the occupants of the car. The same indicia of 
arrest were present here as were present in Mirquet. The "length 
and form of the interrogation evidenced a coercive intent on the 
part of the officer which significantly bore on the ultimate 
question." Mirquet, 268 Utah Adv. Rep. at 4. See also State v. 
Mirquet, 844 P.2d at 998 (questioning shifts from investigatory to 
accusatory when ut police have reasonable grounds to believe that a 
crime has been committed and also reasonable grounds to believe 
that the defendant has committed it.")(citations omitted). 
Any reasonable person in Mr. Becker' s circumstances would have 
reasonably believed at the time that "his freedom of action was 
curtailed to the degree associated with formal arrest." Mirquetr 
844 P.2d at 997. Because Mangelson failed to inform Mr. Becker of 
his Miranda rights prior to this custodial interrogation, all 
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evidence flowing from the interrogation should have been 
suppressed. 
Mr. Means was correct in arguing that Mangelson' s finding 
marijuana in the car may have provided probable cause to obtain a 
search warrant, but did not justify a search of the entire car.1 
Under Utah law, in order to perform a warrantless automobile 
search, an officer would have to have both probable cause and 
exigent circumstances, which were not present in this case. See 
e.g. State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990)(plurality). 
See also State v. Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, 973 n.7 (Utah App. 
1992)(indicating that under Utah law, in contrast to the federal, 
it appears that an officer' s detection of the smell of marijuana 
does not dispense with the exigent circumstance showing needed to 
justify a warrantless search); State v. Dudleyr 847 P.2d 424, 426 
1
 Mr. Means' written motion to suppress alleged 
violations of both the state and federal constitutions, and 
called upon the state to meet its burden to justify the 
warrantless search of the car ( R. 169-171). At the hearing on 
the motion to suppress, Mr. Means argued that the smell of 
marijuana may have provided probable cause to obtain a warrant, 
but did not provide authority to search without a warrant (T. 
59).. This argument was consistent with Utah State Constitutional 
law, such as Larocco. 
In the event that the Court feels that Mr. Means' 
articulation of the argument before the trial court was somehow 
wanting, this Court should nonetheless address the state 
constitutional argument on appeal, and may do so under either the 
plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines. 
Larocco, Dudley, and Naisbitt were all decided and published 
prior to the disposition of Mr. Becker' s motion to suppress. 
Trial counsel and the trial court should both have been aware of 
and applying this law, and any failure to do so would clearly 
have prejudiced Mr. Becker. See State v. Brooks, 868 P.2d 818, 
822 (Utah App.)(discussing common standard for reversal on 
allegations of plain error and ineffective assistance of 
counsel), cert, grantedr 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). 
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n.2 (Utah App. 1993)(same). But see State v. Spurcreon, 274 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah 1995)(under federal decisions, Mangelson had 
probable cause to search an entire car, including the trunk of the 
car, based on his smell of burnt marijuana and other factors). 
Exclusion is the only result from a violation of Article I section 
14 of the Utah Constitution. E.g. Larocco, 794 P.2d at 472-73 
(plurality). 
Where the marijuana in this case was seized illegally, the 
consent obtained thereafter was no consent unless it was 
sufficiently attenuated from the illegal seizure. The consent and 
searches followed immediately on the heels of the seizure of the 
roaches, and there were no intervening facts to show that the 
consent was not the product of the illegal interrogation and 
seizure. See State v. Shoulderblade. 276 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 
1995)(discussing need to prove attenuation of consent from illegal 
searches and seizures); State v. Zieglemanr 276 Utah Adv. Rep. 56 
(Utah App. 1995)(same). 
While the prosecutor and trial court apparently believed that 
the finding of the marijuana in the ashtray justified a search of 
the entire car, including the trunk of the car, there was no 
evidence presented concerning the impound and inventory policy 
governing the search, or indicating that Trooper Mangelson had 
placed the parties under arrest at the time of the search. 
Perhaps more importantly, the prosecutor and trial court failed to 
appreciate the fact that the marijuana was found through the 
violation of Mr. Becker' s rights under Miranda, and like the 
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derivative evidence in Mirquet, the derivative evidence in this 
case should have been suppressed. 
While it appears that the facts of this case demonstrate 
actual coercion on Mangelson' s part, because the State did not 
argue to the trial court that the physical evidence should not be 
suppressed absent proof of actual coercion, this Court should not 
entertain such an argument on appeal, but should hold that 
suppression of the evidence is the appropriate remedy. See 
Mirquet, 844 P.2d at 1001 (court declined to address state's 
argument raised for the first time on appeal that absent actual 
coercion, physical evidence derived through a Miranda violation 
should not be suppressed); affirmed, 268 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 5. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT 
SHOULD HAVE GIVEN THE REQUESTED LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION. 
A. Facts of this case 
Mr. Means requested a lesser included offense instruction on 
the offense of joy-riding, a class A misdemeanor (R. 120), which 
stated, 
As an alternative to reaching a verdict on Count I, 
Auto Theft, a Second Degree Felony, you may find the 
Defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of 
Unlawful Control Over a Motor Vehicle, a class "A" 
misdemeanor, if you find the following: 
-The Defendant; 
-On or about 7 October, 1993; 
-In Juab County, State of Utah; 
-Exercised unlawful control over a motor vehicle; 
-not his own; 
-without the consent of the owner or lawful custodian; 
-with the intent to temporarily deprive the owner or 
lawful custodian of possession of the motor vehicle. 
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(R. 120). The court only gave a third degree felony joyriding 
instruction, which stated, 
As an alternative to reaching a verdict on Count I, 
Auto Theft, a Second Degree Felony, you my find the 
Defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of 
Unlawful Control Over a Motor Vehicle for an Extended 
Period of Time, a Third Degree Felony, if you find the 
following: 
-The Defendant; 
-On or about 7 October, 1993; 
-In Juab County, State of Utah; 
-Exercised unlawful control over a motor vehicle; 
-And did not return the motor vehicle to the owner or 
lawful custodian 
-within 24 hours of the exercise of unlawful control. 
(R. 212). Mr. Means objected to the trial court' s failure to give 
the class A misdemeanor instruction (T. 340). 
B. Applicable law 
In State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme 
Court explained why due process of law requires a trial court to 
give a defendant' s requested lesser included offense instruction if 
the evidence warrants the instruction; the lesser included offense 
instruction gives the defendant the full benefit of the beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard of proof by giving the jury an 
alternative between convicting the defendant of a more serious 
charge of which he is not guilty and acquitting him. Id. at 156-
157. In determining whether it is necessary to instruct on a 
lesser included offense, the trial court must first determine that 
there is some overlap in the elements of the charged offense and 
the lesser offense. Id. at 158-159. If there is some overlap in 
the legal elements, the trial court must assess the evidence to 
determine that there is a aia rational basis for a verdict 
acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him 
of the included offense.' " Id. at 159, quoting Utah Code Ann. §76-
1-402. In making this assessment, courts are not to weigh the 
credibility of the evidence, but should give the lesser included 
offense instruction if there is evidence to raise a jury question. 
Id. See also State v. Chesnut, 621 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980)(court 
must give lesser included offense instruction on the defendant' s 
request if there is any evidence however slight on any reasonable 
theory of the case to justify it). If there is statutory overlap 
in the elements and a reasonable basis for acquitting of the 
charged offense and convicting of the lesser offense, the trial 
court has no discretion to refuse to give the lesser included 
offense instruction. State v. Simpsonf 274 Utah Adv. Rep. 44, 45 
(Utah App. 1995). 
The statutory elements of theft and class A misdemeanor 
joyriding overlap. Theft is defined by Utah Code Ann. Section 76-
6-404 as follows: "A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercised unauthorized control over the property of another with a 
purpose to deprive him thereof."2 Utah Code Ann. Section 41-la-
1311 defines class A joyriding as follows: "It is a class A 
2
 Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-401(3) provides, 
MPurpose to deprive" means to have the conscious 
object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or 
for so extended a period or to use under such 
circumstances that a substantial portion of 
its economic value, or of the use and benefit 
thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property only upon 
payment of a reward or other compensation; or 
(c) To dispose of the property under 
circumstances that make it unlikely that the 
owner will recover it. 
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misdemeanor for a person to exercise unauthorized control over a 
motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer not his own, without the 
consent of the owner or lawful custodian and with intent to 
temporarily deprive the owner or lawful custodian of the motor 
vehicle, trailer, or semi-trailer." Because both offenses involve 
the proof of one' s exercising unauthorized control over the 
property of another, the first portion of the Baker test is met. 
See State v. Simpson
 f 274 Utah Adv. Rep. 46 (Utah App. 
1995)(statutory overlap is established if the same facts prove 
elements of two offenses). 
There was a basis in the evidence for acquitting Mr. Becker of 
the theft charge because the evidence suggests that he did not have 
the "purpose to deprive" the owner of her car. Because he clearly 
exercised unauthorized control over the car without her consent and 
with the intent to temporarily deprive her of her car, there was 
certainly a basis for convicting him of the class A misdemeanor. 
See Simpson at 47 (lesser included offense instruction should go to 
the jury if there is evidence to establish a jury question as to 
acquittal of the charged offense and conviction of the lesser). 
While the trial court gave the jury the lesser included 
offense instruction for a third degree felony joyriding conviction, 
this did not obviate the trial court' s responsibility to give the 
class A misdemeanor instruction under Baker. See e.g. State v. 
Jones, 878 P. 2d 1175 (Utah App. 1994)(conviction for lesser 
included offense reversed because trial court refused to give 
instruction on different lesser included offense, as requested by 
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the defense). Assuming arguendo that the trial court had the 
option to choose between requested lesser included offense 
instructions, the trial court made the wrong choice in giving the 
jury the option of the third degree felony joyriding. This is so 
because it appears that the car was recovered the same day it was 
stolen — Trooper Mangelson testified that he recovered the car 
shortly after the chase of Mr. Becker began (T. 167). In these 
circumstances, the jury may have felt that it was inappropriate to 
convict Mr. Becker of an offense which contained an element that 
the defendant failed to return the car within 24 hours.3 The class 
A misdemeanor instruction would have been more appropriate, because 
it contained an element of intent to temporarily deprive the owner, 
without specifying the length of time involved. 
In any event, the class A misdemeanor instruction met both 
prongs of the Baker test, and the trial court committed reversible 
error in failing to give it. Id. 
3
 Utah Code Ann. Section 41-la-1314 defines the third 
degree felony offense as follows: 
(1) It is a third degree felony to exercise 
unauthorized control over a motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer if the person does not return the motor 
vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer to the owner or lawful 
custodian within 24 hours after the exercise of 
unauthorized control. 
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of 
a motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer to its control 
by the actor is not in any case presumed or implied 
because of the owner' s or legal custodian' s consent on 
a previous occasion to the control of the motor 
vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer by the same or a 
different person. 
35 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE EXCLUDED 
EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE CONTENTS OF 
THE PAPER BAG. 
A. Facts of this case 
Mr. Means submitted a motion in limine seeking to exclude, 
under Utah Rules of Evidence 402 and 403, evidence concerning 
Trooper Mangelson' s speculations concerning the contents of the 
brown bag taken by Mr. Becker (R. 127-128). In arguing the 
motion, Mr. Means contended, 
My argument then and my argument now well, this officer 
has got considerable time on the road and I think he said 
27 years and I respect that. He has had training as an 
officer and drug interdiction on that and to make 
reference to the exact chemical composition or exactly 
what the substance was in the bag calls for expertise 
that he doesn' t have. 
Also, I don' t believe that it is relevant to know 
what necessarily was in that bag either for purposes of 
the Suppression Hearing or the trial. Mr. Becker is 
charged with the destruction of evidence that I argued at 
the Pre-trial, pre-trial management hearing when the 
motion was considered, the Motion in Limine was 
considered. I don' t think that it matters whether the 
bag was empty or full of candy or full of Crack Cocaine. 
All the State needs to do to carry its burden on that 
issue is to establish that Mr. Becker absconded with the 
evidence, that is my guess as to their theory of the case 
regardless of what it might be even if the bag were 
empty. So I don' t think it is important either for the 
Suppression Hearing or for the trial that he be allowed 
to give you an opinion as to what the substance might 
have been. 
(T. 24-25). The prosecutor argued that Mangelson was qualified to 
identify the substance, and that its identity gave him a basis for 
further investigation (T. 25). After requiring the prosecutor to 
lay further foundation on Trooper Mangelson' s ability to identify 
the contents of the bag, the court denied the motion to suppress 
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the trooper' s speculation on the contents of the bag (T. 25; R. 
162) . 
Trooper Mangelson testified that he believed that the bag 
contained crack cocaine or methamphetamine, and that if Mr. Becker 
had not run off with the paper bag, the occupants of the car would 
have been subject to federal prosecutions involving minimum 
mandatory sentences for possession with intent to distribute (T. 
200). Mr. Means established that this was somewhat speculative 
testimony, given that Mangelson did not know what was in the bag 
(T. 204). In closing argument, the prosecutor stated, 
I mean, you know, it doesn' t take a bright person to 
think to know this is evidence. That this is evidence of 
a crime of unlawful possession of a controlled 
substances. A very serious offense, given the quantity 
and the nature of this particular controlled substances. 
Sergeant Mangelson knowing that it is evidence, 
takes it and puts it on top of the car while he is trying 
to restrain and arrest Mr. Becker. Mr. Becker breaks 
through and gets lose and he takes that and Sergeant 
Mangelson sees him with it all the way to the point where 
he steals the car. That bag is never recovered. 
Clearly, Mr. Becker, his actions are such that it 
impairs the availability of that evidence for the 
official proceedings or investigation. 
You know Mr. Becker has already beat the system if 
you want to look at it that way. He has accomplished 
what he intended to accomplish. He has avoided the much 
more serious crime that he would have been charged with 
if the officer had been able to retain that evidence, but 
he should not get away with the consequences of this 
crime that being tampering with evidence. 
(T. 353-54). 
B. Applicable law 
In traditional drug cases, the state must present 
toxicological analysis of a controlled substance to establish what 
it is. See generally State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 
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1989)(under Utah Rule of Evidence 702, expert may testify about 
scientific matters if scientific principles and techniques are 
reliable). Assuming arguendo that Mangelson was qualified to 
speculate as to the contents of the paper bag, his speculation 
should nonetheless have been excluded because it was irrelevant and 
unduly prejudicial. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 402 provides for the admission of "[a] 11 
relevant evidence .. . except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state 
of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable 
in courts of this state. ..." Relevant evidence is defined by Utah 
Rule of Evidence 401, as "evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence." Utah Rule of Evidence 403 provides, 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
Utah law interpreting these rules demonstrates the error of 
admitting the evidence concerning the contents of the bag.. 
Under Utah Rule of Evidence 403, courts are to presume that 
relevant evidence is admissible unless the evidence at issue falls 
within a class of evidence known to have "an unusual propensity to 
unfairly prejudice, inflame or mislead the jury." State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201, 1221-22 (Utah 1993). In the event that the evidence 
fell within such a class, the proponent of the evidence would then 
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have the burden to show the unusual probative value of the 
evidence. Id. 
Evidence of uncharged crimes is considered to be presumptively 
prejudicial, State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985), and 
under Dunn, it was the prosecutor1 s duty to establish the unusual 
probative value of the evidence, assuming that the evidence was 
even relevant. 
The prosecutor argued that the evidence was essential to show 
a basis for the trooper's continuing investigation (T. 25). 
Particularly in the jury trial, there was no need to establish any 
basis for the trooper' s continuing investigation. As Mr. Means 
argued, the contents of the bag were neither relevant nor necessary 
to the prosecution of the tampering with the evidence charge.4 
Because the State did not establish an unusual probative value for 
the evidence, and because it was presumptively prejudicial, the 
trial court should have excluded the evidence. Dunn. 
The State' s case against Mr. Becker on the evidence tampering 
charge was directly contradicted by the defense case. Mangelson 
testified that Mr. Becker ran off with a paper bag containing crack 
4
 Tampering with evidence is defined by Utah Code Ann. 
Section 76-8-510 as follows: 
A person commits a felony of the second degree if, 
believing that an official proceeding or investigation 
is pending or about to be instituted, he: 
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or 
removes anything with a purpose to impair its 
verity or availability in the proceeding or 
investigation; or 
(2) Makes, presents, or uses anything 
which he knows to be false with a purpose to 
deceive a public servant who is or may be 
engaged in a proceeding or investigation. 
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cocaine or methamphetamine, while Lisa La Barrie testified that 
there was no bag found by Mangelson or taken by Mr. Becker. 
Particularly given the prosecutor' s closing argument, wherein he 
told the jury that Mr. Becker had already "beat the system" by 
taking the drugs and avoiding the more serious drug charge, and 
urged the jury to see to it that he was held accountable for the 
charge before the jury, there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
jury was improperly influenced to convict Mr. Becker of the 
evidence tampering charge. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Becker requests a new trial, wherein the voir dire is 
adequate, improper evidence is excluded, and the jury is instructed 
properly. 
Respectfully submitted this day of CPM her , 
1995. 
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Appendix 1 
Statutes, Rules and Constitutional Provisions 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 10 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall 
remain inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, 
except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight 
jurors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury 
shall consist of four jurors. In criminal cases the 
verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-
fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in 
civil cases shall be waived unless demanded. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of 
the county or district in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees 
to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, 
nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a 
. preliminary examination, the function of the 
examination is limited to determining whether probable 
cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. 
Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of 
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule 
in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding 
with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate 
discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable 
cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or 
thing to be seized. 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
United States Constitution, Amendment V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, 
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his 
defence. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-la-1311 
It is a class A misdemeanor for a person to 
exercise unauthorized control over a motor vehicle, 
trailer, or semitrailer not his own, without the 
consent of the owner or lawful custodian and with 
intent to temporarily deprive the owner or lawful 
custodian of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semi-
trailer. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-la-1314 
(1) It is a third degree felony to exercise 
unauthorized control over a motor vehicle, trailer, or 
semitrailer if the person does not return the motor 
vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer to the owner or lawful 
custodian within 24 hours after the exercise of 
unauthorized control. 
(2) The consent of the owner or legal custodian of 
a motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer to its control 
by the actor is not in any case presumed or implied 
because of the owner' s or legal custodian' s consent on 
a previous occasion to the control of the motor 
vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer by the same or a 
different person. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-1-402 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single 
criminal action for all separate offenses arising out 
of a single criminal episode; however, when the same 
act of a defendant under a single criminal episode 
shall establish offenses which may be punished in 
different ways under different provisions of this code, 
the act shall be punishable under only one such 
provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence 
under any such provision bars a prosecution under any 
other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate 
offenses under a single criminal episode, unless the 
court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant 
shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple 
offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the 
jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the 
prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first 
information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense 
included in the offense charged but may not be 
convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the 
same or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense 
charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, 
solicitation, conspiracy, or form of 
preparation to commit the offense charged or 
an offense otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a 
statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the 
jury with respect to an included offense unless there 
is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of 
the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict 
or judgment, or an appellate court on appeal or 
certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for the offense 
charged but that there is sufficient evidence to 
support a conviction for an included offense and the 
trier of fact necessarily found every fact required for 
conviction of that included offense, the verdict or 
judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and 
a judgment of conviction entered for the included 
offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such 
relief is sought by the defendant. 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-401 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including 
real estate, tangible and intangible personal property, 
captured or domestic animals and birds, written 
instruments or other writings representing or embodying 
rights concerning real or personal property, labor, 
services, or otherwise containing anything of value to 
the owner, commodities of a public utility nature such 
as telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or 
water, and trade secrets, meaning the whole or any 
portion of any scientific or technical information, 
design, process, procedure, formula or invention which 
the owner thereof intends to be available only to 
persons selected by him. 
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to 
bring about a transfer of possession or of some other 
legally recognized interest in property, whether to the 
obtainer or another, in relation to labor or services, 
to secure performance thereof; and in relation to a 
trade secret to make any facsimile, replica, 
photograph, or other reproduction. 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the 
conscious object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently or 
for so extended a period or to use under such 
circumstances that a substantial portion of 
its economic value, or of the use and benefit 
thereof, would be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property only upon 
payment of a reward or other compensation; or 
(c) To dispose of the property under 
circumstances that make it unlikely that the 
owner will recover it. 
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" 
means, but is not necessarily limited to, conduct 
heretofore defined or known as common-law larceny by 
trespassory taking, larceny be conversion, larceny by 
bailee, and embezzlement• 
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person 
intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or 
conduct an impression of law or fact that is 
false and that the actor does not believe to 
be true and that is likely to affect the 
judgment of another in the transaction; or 
(b) Fails to correct a false impression 
of law or fact that the actor previously 
created or confirmed by words or conduct that 
is likely to affect the judgment of another 
and that the actor does not now believe to be 
true; or 
(c) Prevents another from acquiring 
information likely to affect his judgment in 
the transaction; or 
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or 
encumbers property without disclosing a lien, 
security interest, adverse claim, or other 
legal impediment to the enjoyment of the 
property, whether the lien, security 
interest, claim or impediment is or is not 
valid or is or is not a matter of official 
record; or 
(e) Promises performance that is likely 
to affect the judgment of another in the 
transaction, which performance the actor does 
not intend to perform or knows will not be 
performed; provided, however, that failure to 
perform the promise in issue without other 
evidence of intent or knowledge is not 
sufficient proof that the actor did not 
intend to perform or knew the promise would 
not be performed. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-404 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises 
unauthorized control over the property of another with 
a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-1-6 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by 
counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed 
against him; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the 
attendance of witnesses in his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury 
of the county or district where the offense is alleged 
to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with 
provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial within 30 
days after arraignment if unable to post bail and if 
the business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for 
the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to 
secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or the 
laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when 
received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband nor a husband against his wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict 
of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no contest, or 
upon a judgment of a court when trial by jury has ben 
waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by 
a magistrate. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the 
number of the jurors that are to try the cause plus 
such an additional number as will allow for all 
peremptory challenges permitted. After each challenge 
for cause sustained, another juror shall be called to 
fill the vacancy before further challenges are made, 
and any such new juror may be challenged for cause. 
When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk 
shall make a list of the jurors remaining, and each 
side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate 
thereon is peremptory challenge to one juror at a time 
in regular turn, as the court may direct, until all 
peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The 
clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many 
of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, 
in the order in which they appear on the list, and the 
persons whose names are so called shall constitute the 
jury. 
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant 
to conduct the examination of the prospective jurors or 
may itself conduct the examination. In the latter 
event, the court may permit counsel or the defendant to 
supplement the examination by such further inquiry as 
it deems proper, or may itself submit to the 
prospective jurors additional questions requested by 
counsel or the defendant. 
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an 
individual juror. 
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called 
to serve at a particular court or for the 
trial of a particular action. A challenge to 
the panel is an objection made to all jurors 
summoned and may be taken by either party. 
(i) A challenge to the panel 
can be founded only on a material 
departure from the procedure 
prescribed with respect to the 
selection, drawing, summoning and 
return of the panel. 
(ii) The challenge to the 
panel shall be taken before the 
jury is sworn and shall be in 
writing or recorded by the 
reporter. It shall specifically 
set forth the facts constituting 
the grounds of the challenge. 
(iii) If a challenge to the 
panel is opposed by the adverse 
party, a hearing may be had to try 
any question of fact upon which the 
challenge is based. The jurors 
challenged, and any other persons, 
may be called as witnesses at the 
hearing thereon. 
(iv) The court shall decide 
the challenge. If the challenge to 
the panel is allowed, the court 
shall discharge the jury so far as 
the trial in question is concerned. 
If a challenge is denied, the court 
shall direct the selection of the 
jurors to proceed. 
(2) A challenge to an individual juror 
may be either peremptory or for cause. A 
challenge to an individual juror may be made 
only before the jury is sworn to try the 
action, except the court may, for good cause, 
permit it to be made after the juror is sworn 
but before any of the evidence is presented. 
In challenges for cause the rules relating to 
challenges to a panel and hearings thereon 
shall apply. All challenges for cause shall 
be taken first by the prosecution and then by 
the defense. 
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a 
juror for which no reason need be given. In capital 
cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory 
challenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled 
to four peremptory challenges. In misdemeanor cases, 
each side is entitled to three peremptory challenges. 
If there is more than one defendant the court may allow 
the defendants additional peremptory challenges and 
permit them to be exercised separately or jointly. 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a 
particular juror and may be taken on one or more of the 
following grounds: 
(1) want of any of the 
qualifications prescribed by law; 
(2) any mental or physical infirmity 
which renders one incapable of performing the 
duties of a juror; 
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the 
fourth degree to the person alleged to be 
injured by the offense charged, or on whose 
complaint the prosecution was instituted; 
(4) the existence of any social, legal, 
business, fiduciary or other relationship 
between the prospective juror and any party, 
witness or person alleged to have been 
victimized or injured by the defendant, which 
relationship when viewed objectively, would 
suggest to reasonable minds that the 
prospective juror would be unable or 
unwilling to return a verdict which would be 
free of favoritism. A prospective juror 
shall not be disqualified solely because he 
is indebted or employed by the state or a 
political subdivision thereof; 
(5) having been or being the party 
adverse to the defendant in a civil action, 
or having complained against or having been 
accused by him in a criminal prosecution; 
(6) having served on the grand jury 
which found the indictment; 
(7) having served on a trial jury which 
has tried another person for the particular 
offense charged; 
(8) having been one of a jury formally 
sworn to try the same charge, and whose 
verdict was set aside, or which was 
discharged without a verdict after the case 
was submitted to it; 
(9) having served as a juror in a civil 
action brought against the defendant for the 
act charged as an offense; 
(10) if the offense charged is 
punishable with death, the entertaining of 
such conscientious opinions about the death 
penalty as would preclude the juror from 
voting to impose the death penalty following 
conviction regardless of the facts; 
(11) because he is or, within one yea,r 
preceding, has been engaged or interested in 
carrying on any business, calling or 
employment, the carrying on of which is a 
violation of law, where defendant is charged 
with a like offense; 
(12) because he has been a witness, 
either for or against the defendant on the 
preliminary examination or before the grand 
jury; 
(13) having formed or expressed an 
unqualified opinion or belief as to whether 
the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the 
offense charged; 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the 
part of the juror with reference to the 
cause, or to either party, which will prevent 
him from acting impartially and without 
prejudice to the substantial rights of the 
party challenging; but no person shall be 
disqualified as a juror by reason of having 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the 
matter or cause to be submitted to such jury, 
founded upon public rumor, statements in 
public journals or common notoriety, if it 
satisfactorily appears to the court that the 
juror can and will, notwithstanding such 
opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the 
matter to be submitted to him. 
(f) peremptory challenges shall be taken first by 
the prosecution and then by the defense alternately. 
Challenges for cause shall be completed before 
peremptory challenges are taken. 
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be 
impanelled. Alternate jurors, in the order in which 
they are called, shall replace jurors who are, or 
become, unable or disqualified to perform their duties. 
The prosecution and defense shall each have one 
additional peremptory challenge for each alternate 
juror to be chosen. 
Alternate jurors shall have the same 
qualifications, take the same oath and enjoy the same 
privileges as regular jurors. 
(h) A statutory exemption from service as a juror 
is a privilege of the person exempted and is not a 
ground for challenge for cause. 
(i) When the jury is selected an oath shall be 
administered to the jurors, in substance, that they and 
each of them will well and truly try the matter in 
issue between the parties, and render a true verdict 
according to the evidence and the instructions of the 
court. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 401 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having nay 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than in would be without the 
evidence. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 402 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as 
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United 
States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules 
applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is 
not relevant is not admissible. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 702 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form 
of an opinion or otherwise. 
